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XI. UNNEUTRAL SERVICE 
Apart from the carriage of contraband and the breach of blockade the 
subjects of a neutral state may assist a belligerent in a number of ways. 
Almost all of these various acts of assistance may be considered as falling 
within the category of unneutral service. It must be stated at the outset 
that the present position of the law relating to unneutral service is one over 
which widespread dissatisfaction has been expressed, and rightly so. 
Difficulty has been experienced in defining the distinguishing features of 
unneutral service. Covering as it does a great variety of disparate acts the 
concept of unneutral service has come to signify little more than any service 
rendered by a neutral subject to a belligerent contrary to international law, 
excluding the acts of contraband carriage and blockade breach. 1 
The vagueness characterizing the concept of unneutra1 service therefore 
provides one reason for the divergencies that have often attended attempts 
to enumerate the specific acts making up this category. To the foregoing 
must be added the peculiarities that have marked the historical develop-
ment of this area of the law. During the nineteenth century the efforts of 
states were directed primarily to the task of regulating contraband and 
blockade. The development of rules regulating the acts whereby neutrals 
rendered assistance to a belligerent, but which fell outside contraband and 
blockade, was sporadic and uneven. Unneutral service was conceived 
largely in terms of the carriage of certain persons and dispatches fo14 a bel-
ligerent, and frequently treated as a situation analagous to the carriage of 
contraband. Little attention was given to other acts that might qualify 
as coming within this category. Nor does there appear to have been any , 
serious attempt to distinguish more clearly between the various possible 
acts of unneutral service and to attach consequences to their commission 
commensurate with the precise nature and degree of assistance rendered a 
belligerent. 
In the provisions of the I909 Declaration of London relating to unneutral 
service the endeavor was made not only to provide a greater measure of 
uniformity in the practice of states than had previously existed, -but also to 
enlarge upon those acts that could be regarded as constituting unneutral 
service. The Declaration sought further to distinguish between acts 
whose commission would result in the same treatment a neutral vessel 
1 This can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory definition, yet is perhaps the best that can. be 
given. No doubt it is true that acts of unneutral service generally involve a closer relationship 
with, and a greater degree of control by, a belligerent than is the case in contraband carriage. 
But as will be presently noted, there are some acts of unneutral service that appear to require 
no more intense a relationship with a belligerent than is involved in the carriage of contraband. 
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would undergo when liable to condemnation on account of carrying contra-
band and acts whose com1nission would result in neutral vessels receiving the 
same treatment as that accorded enemy merchant vessels. But since the 
Declaration was never ratified its provisions relating to unneutral service 
have never been binding upon states. Even as a general indication of what 
the practice of states ought to be in this regard Articles 45-47 of the Decla-
ration of London may no longer be considered as wholly satisfactory. The 
conditions in which naval hostilities are now conducted have been greatly 
transformed during the past half century. This transformation has un-
deniably affected the kinds of aid a neutral may render to a belligerent (thus 
extending the scope of unneutral service) as well as the severity of the 
measures a belligerent may take in preventing an enemy from receiving 
such assistance. 
The resulting situation is, therefore, not essentially unlike the situation 
encountered in many other areas of the law relating to neutrality in naval 
warfare; no clear and continuous development can be traced from nineteenth 
century practice to the present. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the scope 
of unneu tral service has expanded and that the consequences attached to the 
performance of acts coming within this category have-in certain instances 
at least-become more rigorous. In fact, the variety of acts included within 
the category of unneutral service prevents a useful discussion either of the 
general characteristics of acts of unneutral service or of the general liabilities 
attending the commission of these acts. As distinguished from contraband 
carriage and blockade breach, the consequences following upon the com-
mission of acts of unneutral service may be almost as varied as the acts 
themselves. 
A. ACTS OF UNNEUTRAL SERVICE RESULTING IN LIABILITY 
TO THE SAME TREATMENT AS ENEMY WARSHIPS 
The most serious forms of unneutral service occur when neutral 
merchant vessels (or neutral private aircraft 2) directly participate 
in the military operations of a belligerent, either by entering into the actual 
hostilities or by serving in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to 
2 In the discussion to follow it is assumed that the rules relating to unneutral service are, at 
the very least, equally applicable to neutral private aircraft. This is surely a conservative 
assumption, and it is altogether likely that as practice with respect to neutral aircraft develops 
the rules regulating the behavior of the latter will be much more severe. The 192.3 Hague 
Rules of Aerial Warfare offer little guidance in this respect, providing only that "a neutral 
private aircraft is liable to capture if it is engaged in unneutral service" (Article 53 (c)). Cer-
tainly, the draft rules relating to the control of radio in time of war, and rendering an aircraft 
liable to be fired upon if found transmitting information for the immediate military use of an 
enemy, may be expected to be acted upon by a belligerent. Furthermore, neutral private air-
craft found directly participating in hostilities or serving as an auxiliary to a belligerent's 
armed forces may be expected to receive similar treatment. But what of neutral private air-
craft operating directly under the control or orders of a belligerent, even though not performing 
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belligerent forces (e. g., as colliers, troopships; laying of mines, recon-
noitering). In performing these acts neutral1nerchant vessels (and aircraft) 
are considered to acquire an enemy character and must bear the same treat-
ment accorded to ene1n y warships (and military aircraft). As such they 
are always liable to capture and-if necessary-to attack and destruction 
on sight. 3 
services related to military operations? And, finally, what of neutral aircraft known to be 
transporting enemy persons-particularly persons incorporated in the armed forces of an enemy-
though not under the direct control or orders of an enemy? It would be futile to present an 
oversimplified analogy to the rules governing neutral merchant vessels. Where interception 
and seizure is rendered impossible, neutral private aircraft will run the strong risk of being 
shot down when known to be engaged in the above described acts. Nor is it clear that such 
action on the part of a belligerent would necessarily prove unlawful. 
3 Law of Naval Warfare, Article sora: "Neutral merchant vessels and aircraft acquire enemy 
character and are liable to the same treatment as enemy warships and military aircraft ... when 
engaged in the following acts: 
r. Taking a direct part in the hostilities on the side of an enemy; 
2.. Acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's armed forces." 
On the other hand, Article 46 of the Declaration of London stated: ··A neutral vessel is 
liable to be condemned and, in a general way, is liable to the same treatment which she would 
undergo if she were a merchant vessel of the enemy: 
(r) If she takes a direct part in the hostilities. 
(2.) If she is under the orders or control of an agent placed on board by the enemy Govern-
ment. 
(3) If she is chartered entire by the enemy Government. 
(4) If she is at the time and exclusively either devoted to the transport of enemy troops 
or to the transmission of information in the interest of the enemy. 
"In the cases specified in the present Article, the goods belonging to the owner of the vessel 
are likewise liable to condemnation." 
Neither paragraphs 2. nor 3 of Article 46 of necessity involve acts in direct support of a bellig-
erent's military operations, but paragraphs I and 4 do clearly imply such support. In this 
latter respect, then, there is an evident divergence between Article 46 of the Declaration of 
London and Article sora of the Law of Naval Warfare (as well as the position taken in the text ' 
above), the difference consisting in the more severe treatment permitted by the latter. There 
is strong support for the position that the acts in question should be regarded, when performed 
by neutral vessels, as resulting in the same treatment as enemy warships. Thus Articles 2. 
and 6r of the French Naval Instructions of 1934, and Articles 141, 179, and r8o of the Italian 
War Law of 1938, provide for either the attack upon or capture of neutral merchant vessels 
directly participating in hositlities. See also Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of 
Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 653 ff. Article 6s of the Harvard Draft 
Convention, which is described in the commentary as correctly reflecting existing law, states 
that: "A belligerent may treat as an enemy warship: (a) A neutral vessel taking a direct part 
in hostilities on the side of the enemy; (b) a neutral vessel exclusively engaged at the time in 
the transportation of enemy troops." Articles 38-40 of the German Prize Law Code of Sep-
tember 1939 are, in this respect, somewhat equivocal, though the same inference may be drawn. 
And for a clear statement in support of the more severe treatment, see H. A. Smith, op. cit., 
pp. IOI, ros.-It is interesting to note that Article r6 of the u. s. Naval VJ'ar Code of 1900 
provided that: "Neutral vessels in the military or naval service of the enemy, or under the 
control of the enemy for military or naval purposes, are subject to capture or destruction.'' 
Whereas the I9r7 and I94I Instrtlctions followed the Declaration of London, Article sora of the 
Law of Naval Warfare signifies-in a sense--a return to this earlier and more severe position. 
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The general principle involved is reasonably clear, and no attempt need 
be made to enumerate all of the acts that may result in this assimilation to 
an enemy's armed forces. It is not the mere fact of assisting a belligerent 
that permits this severe treatment. Nor is it simply the consideration that 
the belligerent exercises a close control and direction over the neutral 
merchant vessel. The decisive consideration is rather that the services 
rendered are in direct support of the belligerent's military operations. It 
is this support, leading as it does to the identification of the neutral mer-
chant vessel (or aircraft) with the belligerent's naval or military forces, 
that permits a treatment similar to that meted out to these forces. 
These considerations would seem to have an even broader application. 
It may be recalled that in an earlier discussion 4 concerning the liability of 
enemy merchant vessels to attack it was concluded that the retention of 
immunities traditionally granted belligerent merchant vessels is dependent 
upon their not being integrated in any manner into the belligerents military 
effort at sea. Among the acts which may lead to such integration are 
sailing under convoy of belligerent warships or military aircraft and 
participation in the intelligence system of a belligerent's armed forces. 
There would appear to be no valid reason why neutral merchant vessels 
should escape treatment similar to that taken against belligerent merchant 
vessels, if found performing these same acts. It is true that the acts do not 
of necessity imply either direct participation in hostilities or serving as a 
naval or military auxiliary to a belligerent. Yet the relationship to the 
belligerent's military effort is sufficiently close to warrant the loss of the 
exemption from attack and destruction that 1nust normally be accorded 
neutral merchant vessels. 5 
4 See pp. 67-70. 
5 In the case of neutral vessels under convoy of belligerent warships the high degree of identi-
fication with the belligerent whose protection is sought is obvious. Although opinion has been 
unsettled in the past over the consequences to be attached to this act there is now a substantial 
consensus that the mere fact of enemy convoy is sufficient to assimilate a neutral vessel to the 
status of the belligerent warc;hips providing protection. For a review of pre-World War II 
practice, see Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial 
War, op. cit., pp. 674-80. A similar conclusion may be drawn with respect to neutral merchant 
vessels that deliberately reveal the position of the warships of one belligerent to an enemy. 
There is no reason why the neutral vessel that sends in position reports on belligerent warships 
should receive preferential treatment over enemy merchant vessels performing the same act, 
and the latter are, in this case, liable to attack (see pp. 67-8). In this respect, Article 6, para-
graphs I and 2., of the unratified 192.3 Hague Rules for the Control of Radio in Time of War 
provided: 
"The transmission by radio by a vessel or an aircraft, whether enemy or neutral, when 
on or over the high seas of military intelligence for the immediate use of a belligerent is to 
be deemed a hostile act and will render the vessel or aircraft liable to be fired upon. 
2.. A neutral vessel or neutral aircraft which transmits when on or over the high seas 
information destined for a belligerent concerning military operations or military forces 
shall be liable to capture. The Prize Court may condemn the vessel or aircraft if it considers 
that the circumstances justify condemnation." 
H. A. Smith (op. cit., p. Io8) states of these provisions: "The wording is not quite so clear as 
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B. ACTS OF UNNEUTRAL SERVICE RESULTING IN LIABILITY 
TO THE SAME TREATMENT AS ENEMY MERCHANT VESSELS 
Neutral merchant vessels (and aircraft) may be found operating directly 
under the control of a belligerent government, though not in support of the 
belligerent's military operations at sea. Thus a neutral vessel may be 
chartered entire to a belligerent government for the purpose of undertaking 
commercial voyages. If not chartered it may nevertheless be under the 
orders of an agent placed on board by the belligerent government. The 
precise form such control may take will vary, but in all instances where 
neutral merchant vessels are found to be operating directly under enemy · 
control, orders, charter, employment, or direction, they may be considered 
as having thereby acquired enemy character and are liable to the same treat-
ment normally accorded enemy merchant vessels. 6 
The reason for distinguishing between the present and the preceding 
category must be found in the nature of the service that is performed. In 
both categories there is a close identification with the belligerent on vvhose 
behalf the acts of unneutral service are performed, and it is this identifica-
tion with-or control by-a belligerent that permits the imputation of 
enemy character to neutral merchant vessels. But in the former category 
the identification extends to the belligerent's armed forces and to his mili-
tary operations at sea, whereas in the present category this is not the case. 
Although acquiring enemy character because operating directly under 
enemy orders or control, such neutral merchant vessels must not be attacked 
and destroyed at sight so long as they retnain clear of all participation in, 
or direct support of, combat operations. 
In this connection a problem of considerable importance arises as a result 
of the attempt by belligerents to institute a system of passes for neutral 
shipping. In principle, it is clear that such devices as the navicert and 
ships warrant are intended to establish an effective control over the , 
activities of neutral merchant vessels. Neutral merchant vessels by sub-
mitting to such a system thereby ease the belligerent's task of patrolling 
the high seas in search either of contraband carriers or of blockade runners. 
It seems reasonably well-established that a neutral merchant vessel in ac-
cepting a safe-conduct pass from a belligerent subjects itself to the control 
of the latter and performs an act of unneutral service. The same cqnclusion 
would appear warranted in the case of a neutral vessel that cooperates with 
a belligerent by voluntarily applying for, and accepting, a navicert or 
it might be, and Article 6 (r) should not be interpreted as meaning that a neutral vessel or 
aircraft not otherwise engaged in the enemy service may be sunk without warning merely 
because she makes a signal that warships are in the neighborhood. The use of force without 
warning can only be justified if there is a deliberate intention to transmit intelligeD:ce of military 
value to the enemy." 
6 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 501b. 
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ship's warrant. 7 If this reasoning is accepted then it must be further 
acknowledged that Germany would have been on solid ground in seizing 
and condemning neutral merchant vessels during both World Wars for the 
mere act of sailing with a navicert issued by the Allied authorities. 8 
7 And as might be expected, a substantial number of German writers have taken the view-
which is not easy to refute-that any neutral vessel submitting to the type of contraband con-
trols established by Great Britain during the two World Wars commits an act of unneutral 
service. See, for example, Bruns, op. cit., p. 85. 
8 The above conclusions are by no means generally accepted, however, and it must be admitted 
that the entire problem raised by navicerts is still a matter of doubt and uncertainty. In both 
World Wars Germany threatened to treat neutral vessels participating in the Allied system of 
navicerts as acquiring enemy character by virtue of submitting to Allied control, though in 
practice the German conduct of unrestricted submarine warfare precluded any substantive 
development in German prize law with respect to the rules governing unneutral service. In 
one World War II decision, however, the German Supreme Prize Tribunal did consider the 
implications of the navicert system at some length. Thus in The Ole Wegger and Other Vessels 
[1942.], a number of Norwegian whaling vessels were condemned which operated for the 
Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission in London. The vessels were found to be under the 
control of the British Government, and thereby engaging in unneutral service in the sense of 
Article 38 (3) of the German Prize Law Code ("Aid to the enemy occurs if a vessel is chartered 
by the enemy government or is under its command or its control"). Part of the evidence 
accepted by the Oberprisenhof as proof that the vessels were under enemy control was the 
presence on board of ships' warrants issued by the British Ministry of \Var Transport, in 
accordance with the Order in Council of July 31, 1940. The following passages taken from 
the judgment deal with navicerts and ships' warrants respectively, and in view of their in-
terest are quoted at some length: 
•• ... In examining the application for a navicert, the British authorities may obtain 
valuable information concerning the purpose and destination of the proposed voyage. This 
applies all the more in the case of a ship's navicert. It has practically the effect of a safe-
conduct, which is intended to guide ships safely through the British contraband control. 
Moreover, the British authorities are thus enabled to extend the preliminary examination 
to the entire cargo of the ship. Any further examination on the high seas or in the port of 
control need therefore only ascertain whether the ship and its cargo are covered by the 
navicert. This means a considerable relief for the British naval forces, for the examining 
man-of-war is soon freed for other tasks . . . 
" ... The control which is sought by the introduction of ships warrants •.. aims not 
at the prohibition of an individual voyage by means of military measures, but at the planned 
control ofthe entire maritime traffic of a shipowner by British authorities, with the intention 
thus to eliminate the application of military measures in the individual case, either entirely 
or in part . . • It is precisely a control of this kind, however, which is envisaged by Article 
38 (3) of the German Prize Regulations. A vessel subject to this control thereby assists and 
facilitates the military and economic conduct of warfare of the enemy Government, and, 
subject to the special circumstances of the case, renders unneutral service." Annual Digest 
and Reports of Public International Law Cases, I94)4f, Case no. 193, pp. 532.-7. 
No clear indication was given as to the nature of the "special circumstances" referred to in 
the concluding sentence. It does appear though that the fact that navicerts or ships' warrants 
are made "compulsory" by one belligerent was not interpreted as necessarily depriving the 
other belligerent of the right to seize neutral merchant vessels (for hostile assistance) which 
complied with the system. And it may be noted that in response to action by the German 
Government during World War I (1918), whereby Swedish steamers carrying non-contraband 
cargoes to overseas countries were granted safe-conduct passes, the United States (Great Britain 
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C. ACTS OF UNNEUTRAL SERVICE RESULTING IN LIABILITY 
TO SEIZURE 
A neutral merchant vessel may aid a belligerent by the performance of 
acts that result in no greater a degree of identification with the belligerent 
than is involved in the norn1al case of contraband carriage. It is therefore 
important to distinguish not only between the nature of the services per-
formed on behalf of an enen1y but also between the varying degrees of 
identification with an enemy that may be involved quite apart from the 
specific services. In undertaking to carry certain persons or dispatches for 
a belligerent a neutral vessel may be operating in the exclusive employment, 
or under the direct control, of the former. The enemy character thereby 
acquired by the vessel is the consequence of the intensity of the relationship 
maintained with the belligerent rather than of the actual services that are 
performed. On the other hand, the carriage of certain persons or dis-
patches may be undertaken in much the same manner as the carriage of 
contraband, that is without implying a direct control by-or a close rela-
tionship with-the belligerent. In the latter event the unneutral service 
thus rendered a belligerent results in a liability to seizure and to subsequent 
condemnation. Nevertheless, the vessel in performing these acts does not 
lose her neutral character, and the act of seizure therefore places a much 
more serious responsibility upon the captor than is normally incurred with 
respect to the seizure of enemy merchant vessels (or of neutral vessels that 
may be considered as having acquired enemy character). 9 
and France concurring) declared in a note to the European neutrals that "such control may 
operate to deprive vessels accepting the same of their neutral character, and the United States 
Government accordingly reserves the right to deal with any vessel which has subjected itself 
tO enemy control as the circumstances in each case may warrant."' cited in Hackworth, op. 
cit., Vol. VII, pp. 106-7.-Rowson (op. cit., pp. 197-8) expresses the opinion that "when navi-
certs are voluntary the degree of voluntary cooperation with a belligerent which is demanded 
of the neutral implies unneutral service on his part tOwards the other belligerent, tO whom 
corresponding rights are automatically given. When navicerts are compulsory, the neutral 
had no choice and the opposing belligerent was not justified in drawing irrebuttable conclusions 
unfavorable tO the neutral in respect of the carriage of goods covered by a navicert to neutral 
territory." On this reasoning the Order in Council of July 31, 1940 may be understood as 
reducing a neutral vessel's liability for unneutral service, since the neutral shipper had the 
choice either of complying with the system thus introduced or of risking seizure (with the 
presumption-rebuttable-of carrying goods with an enemy destination or origin). But 
Rowson's argument is open tO serious question. Nor does it appear tO have been accepted in 
the decision of the Oberprise11hoj, quoted above. The truth of the matter is, it would seem, that 
neutral merchant vessels have been placed by belligerents in an unenviable position, since 
measures on the part of one belligerent compelling neutral vessels tO comply with a system of 
contraband controls may nevertheless allow an enemy to seize vessel~ so complying on the basis 
that the latter have committed an act of unneutral service. 
9 See pp. 34~54 dealing with the destruction of neutral merchant vessels following their 
setzure. 
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I. Carriage of Enenzy Persons 
According to the customary lav.r a belligerent was entitled to prevent 
neutral vessels from transporting persons actually incorporated in the armed 
forces of an enemy. On this point at least state practice during the nine-
teenth century was clear, and neutral vessels that knowing! y transported 
military or naval personnel in the service of an enemy were liable to seizure 
and subsequent condemnation. Equally well settled was the rule that in 
the absence of a treaty a belligerent had no right to remove any enetny 
persons-including military or naval personnel-from a neutral vessel on 
the high seas \Vi thout first seizing the offending vessel and placing her in 
prize. 10 
On many points, however, the practice of states was uncertain. The 
right of a belligerent to prevent the carriage of enemy persons other than 
those embodied in the armed forces of an enemy furnished an example. At 
least one state, Great Britain, claimed the right to seize neutral vessels if 
found carrying enemy agents sent out on public service of an enemy, at the 
public expense of an enemy. 11 Still further, it was not entirely clear 
IO The rule forbidding removal on the high seas was affirmed during the American Civil Vlar 
in the case of the Trmt. The Trmt, a British mail steamer on her way from Havana to Nassau, 
was intercepted by the U. S. S. San Jacinto and compelled to surrender two Confederate com-
missioners sent out by the Confederate Government to represent the latter in France and Great 
Britain. Both the commissioners, Mason and Slidell, as well as their secretaries, were made 
prisoners of war. Great Britain immediately demanded their release, contending, in the first 
instance, that since the terminus of the voyage was neutral territory the persons seized could 
not be regarded as "contraband of war," and a neutral vessel carrying such persons could not 
be considered liable to seizure for contraband carriage. Later, Great Britain contended that a 
neutral vessel could not be prevented from carrying diplomatic agents sent out by a belligerent 
to represent it in a neutral state. The United States, although complying with the demand for 
release of the prisoners, maintained that the error on the part of the captudng officer consisted 
only in a failure to have seized the Trent and to have brought the vessel in for adjudication. 
For a brief account of the incident see Hyde, ·op. cit., pp. 2.165-7· No agreement was reached 
on the status of Mason and Slidell, but it would appear that if not diplomatic representatives 
in the strict sense (if only because the Confederacy had not been accorded recognition at the 
time by neutral states) they came very close to this status. In any event, this aspect of the 
incident does illustrate the rule--which remains valid today-that a neutral vessel carrying 
hona fide diplomatic representatives sent out by a belligerent to a neutral state, or returning 
from a neutral state, is not liable to seizure for such carriage. Nor can a belligerent intercept 
the vessel and remove the personnel. The incident of the Trent also illustrated the inapplicability 
of the law of contraband to cases involving the carriage of enemy persons. Having a neutral 
destination, Mason and Slidell were not "contraband." On the other hand, seizure of the 
vessel might have been based on the ground that they were public agents in the service of the 
enemy and sent out at the public expense of the enemy. 
11 Both the r866 and r888 editions of the British Manual of Naval Prize Law made provision 
to this effect. For a general review of the entire problem, see U. S. Naval War College, Inter-
national Law Situations, rg28, pp. 74 ff. Very doubtful is the claim that prior to World War I 
a neutral vessel could be seized and condemned if found making a voyage with a view to trans-
porting individuals (e. g., reservists), who though not incorporated at the time of seizure in 
the enemy's armed forces would become so upon reaching enemy territory. But Oppenheim-
Lauterpacht (op. cit., p. 833) and Stone (op. cit., p. 5 14), among other writers, contend that 
325 
whether a vessel could be condemned for carrying persons in the at·med 
forces of an enemy if both the owner and master of the vessel 'vere found 
to be ignorant of this fact. 12 
But Article 45 of the Declaration of London stated with respect to the 
carriage of enemy persons that the liability of a neutral vessel to condem-
nation and, in general, to the same treatment accorded as for the carriage of 
contraband would arise in the following circumstances: 
(1) If she is making a voyage especially with a view to the 
transport of individual passengers who are embodied in the armed 
forces of the enemy ... 
(2) If, with the knowledge of the owner, of the one who char-
ters the vessel entire, or of the master, she is transporting a mili-
tary detachment of the enemy, or one or more persons who, 
during the voyage, lend direct assistance to the enemy. 13 
Article 47 of the Declaration contained a provision, at the time alto-
gether novel, which read as follows: 
Any individual embodied in the armed force of the enemy, and 
who is found on board a neutral merchant vessel, may be made a 
prisoner of war, even though there be no ground for the capture of 
the vessel. 
It would prove difficult to state with any assurance the precise modi-
fications the provisions of Article 45 would have made-if generally 
accepted-in the customary law, since in many respects the latter was far 
from clear. In general it may be said that Article 45 sought to restrict 
quite severely belligerent powers. In substance, the category of persons 
neutral vessels were forbidden to carry was limited to persons ··embodied 
in the armed forces of an enemy,'' and even then condemnation could follow 
only if the vessel was either making a voyage ·'especially with a view to 
the customary rules allowed seizure in this latter instance. No mention is made of the point 
in pre-World War I British prize manuals, nor is the matter dealt with in the 1900 U.S. Naval 
War Code. But there need hardly be any doubt over this point today. As will be noted 
presently, vessels making such voyages are liable to seizure and condemnation. 
12 Or if those in control of the neutral vessel were forcibly constrained to carry enemy mili-
tary or naval personnel. In either case, however, the vessel could be seized on probable sus-
picion of acting in the service of the enemy. Failure to obtain subsequent condemnation of 
the vessel did not serve to prevent the captor from removing the noxious personnel-once in 
the captor's port-and making them prisoners of war. 
13 Article 45 went on to state that in the circumstances described-which included in para-
graph 1 "the transmission of information in the interest of the enemy"-goods belonging to the 
owner of the vessel were likewise liable to condemnation. The concluding paragraph of Article 
45 declared that the provisions of the Article "do not apply if when the vessel is encountered 
at sea she is unaware of the opening of hostilities, or if the master, after becoming aware. of 
the hostilities, has not been able to disembark the passengers. The vessel is deemed to ki10w 
of the state of war if she left an enemy port after the opening of hostilities, or a neutral port 
after there had been made in sufficient time a notification of the opening of hostilities to the 
Power to which such port belongs." 
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the transport of individual passengers" or knowlingly transporting a 
" military detachment" of the enemy.14 Article 47, however, went in the 
other direction of granting belligerents a power heretofore denied them by 
the customary law. Nevertheless, this power to remove persons from 
neutral vessels, even though "there be no ground for the capture of the 
vessel," extended only to individuals embodied in the armed forces of an 
enemy. 15 As it turned out this provision too was destined to give rise to 
later controversy between neutrals, who maintained Article 47 represented 
an unwarranted extension of the belligerent's right to interfere with 
neutral vessels, and the belligerents, who considered Article 47 as being 
far too restrictive in modem conditions. 
Since 1914 state practice with respect to the carriage of enemy persons 
has therefore been very unsettled. At the beginning of the hostilities a 
number of the belligerents accepted Articles 45 and 47 of the Declaration of 
London, only to modify them-by way of extending belligerent povvers of 
intercepting enemy persons-as the war progressed. The neutral states, as 
might be expected, fell back upon the strictest possible interpretation of 
belligerent powers. The result has been that the disputants have appealed, 
as the circumstances of their respective situations dictated, to the customary 
rules, to the provisions of the Declaration of London, and to the novel con-
ditions alleged to justify departure from both the customary law and the 
Declaration of London. 
Doubtless a belligerent must be accorded, at the very minimum, those 
powers provided for in Article 45 of the Declaration of London. Where a 
neutral vessel is encountered making a special voyage for the transport of 
members of an enemy's armed forces she may be seized and condemned. 
Nor does it appear useful any longer to question the belligerent right to 
seize neutral vessels specially undertaking to transport individuals who, 
upon reaching an enemy destination., will be incorporated into the enen1y's 
armed forces. The same right of seizure may be considered applicable to 
neutral vessels found making a voyage for the purpose of conveying public 
agents of an enemy (though not hona fide diplomatic representatives of an 
enemy destined to or from a neutral state), regardless of whether such con-
veyance is to an enemy destination or to a neutral state, so long as the pur-
pose is to promote the military operations of the enemy. Admittedly, 
neither of these latter grounds for seizure were recognized by the Declaration 
of London, and their support in the customary law is questionable. Yet it 
is clear that in each instance the neutral merchant vessel renders a distinct 
14 The additional category of "persons who, during the voyage, lend direct assistance to the 
enemy" is far from clear and never seems to have been satisfactorily explained. 
15 Thus, Article 47 compensated in part for the restrictions contained in Article 45· Bellig-
erents could remove enemy military personnel from neutral vessels even though these personnel 
were traveling in a private capacity and at their own expense. Nor did it matter-according 
to Article 45-that the owner or master of the vessel possessed no knowledge of the status of 
the passengers carried. 
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and important service to an enemy, and one which belligerents can hardly 
be obliged to permit. 
In practice, however, the core of neutral-belligerent controversy during 
the two World Wars has concerned the circumstances in which a belligerent 
is entitled to intercept a neutral merchant vessel at sea and, though not 
seizing the vessel, to remove certain categories of enemy persons found on 
board. It should be noted that there are two distinct, though related, 
questions involved here. The first is whether or not there is a belligerent 
right of removal at all, except after first seizing the vessel for due cause and 
sending her in for adjudication. And if there is a right of removal that 
may be exercised either in place of, or independently from, seizure, to what 
categories of enemy individuals does this right extend? 
Despite neutral opposition during World War I to conceding any belliger-
ent right to remove enemy persons from neutral merchant vessels at sea, it 
would now seem that-in principle-the practice of states may be regarded 
as having sanctioned this belligerent measure. 16 Nor does it appear that a 
16 The attitude of the United States in World War I, both as a neutral and later as a belliger-
ent, is reviewed in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 62.2.-38, and U. S. Naval War College, Inter-
national Law Situations, zg28, pp. 90 ff. In brief, the position of the United States was that 
there existed no legal right-apart from treaty-to remove any enemy person from a neutral 
vessel on the high seas without first seizing the vessel and placing it in prize. Seizure was 
considered justified only when exercised in order to prevent a neutral vessel from knowingly 
engaging in the transport of individuals actually incorporated in the armed forces of an enemy. 
Thus Article 45 of the Declaration of London was accepted whereas Article 47 was rejected, 
a position confirmed in paragraphs 36 and 89 of the 1917 Instructions. Yet in reviewing World 
War I practice, and its effects upon the law, the Naval War College concluded in 192.8 that: "It 
is now generally admitted ... that a belligerent should be permitted to remove enemy com-
batants from a neutral vessel and that it should not be longer necessary to bring such a vessel 
to port to render such action lawful" (p. 1o6). And the 1941 Instructions stipulated in para-
graph 92. that: ''Enemy nationals found on board neutral or enemy merchant vessels as passengers 
who are actually embodied in the military forces of the enemy, or in public service of the enemy, 
or who may be engaged in or suspected of service in the interests of the enemy, may be made 
prisoners of war." As will presently be seen, all of the belligerents during World War II ' 
asserted the right to remove enemy military personnel from neutral vessels, and-as distinguished 
from World War I-the disputes with neutrals no longer concerned the exercise of the right 
itself but the extent of the right. Thus in the case of the Asama Mam, which involved the 
removal by a British warship in January i940 of twenty-one German nationals carried on board 
a Japanese steamship, the Japanese Government did not deny the right of a belligerent to re-
move enemy military personnel from a neutral vessel on the high seas. (Indeed, the Japanese 
Naval Regulations in World War I had expressly permitted the practice.) \Vhat the Japanese 
did deny was the right of a belligerent to remove enemy persons other than those incorporated 
in an enemy's armed forces. The incident of the Asama Maru is carefully reviewed by H. W. 
Briggs, "Removal of Enemy Persons From Neutral Vessels On The High Seas," A.]. I. L., 
34 (1940), pp. 2.49 ff. Professor Briggs concludes, however, that even by 1940 there existed 
"no legal right of removal of any enemy person from a neutral vessel on the high seas." Con-
trast this view with that expressed by Hyde (op. cit., p. 2.173): "It is believed that, at the 
present time, an enemy person whom a belligerent may lawfully intercept in transit, such' as 
one embodied in an armed force and en route for a military service, may be justly removed from 
the neutral ship of which he is an occupant." 
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right of retnoval can be exercised by belligerents only as an alternative to 
the lawful seizure and condemnation of neutral merchant vessels. For the 
right of removal may be exercised even though no sufficient reason may 
exist for the seizure of a neutral vcssel. 17 
The further problem of the categories of enemy persons that a belligerent 
may remove from neutral vessels remains unsettled. A strict interpretation 
of this belligerent right would probably admit-following Article 47 of the 
Declaration of London-the removal only of those persons actually em-
bodied in the armed forces of an enemy and, perhaps, public agents sent out 
in the service of an enemy to perform missions directly related to the con-
duct of military operations. But belligerents have not demonstrated a 
readiness to adhere to this restrictive interpretation and have insisted upon 
including reservists, and even all able-bodied enemy nationals capable of 
rendering military service upon reaching their home country. 18 More 
recently it has been suggested that the belligerent right of removal should 
extend to any enemy individual returning to his own country who may 
prove of value to the war effort 19 (not merely the military effort in a nar-
row sense). And on the basis of this reasoning belligerents might easily 
assert a right of removal to include any enemy national sent out by his 
government to a neutral country, there to undertake services in support of 
the enemy's war effort. 
17 As, for example, when a neutral vessel engaged in a normal commercial voyage but is 
found carrying passengers who, though embodied in the armed forces of an enemy, are traveling 
in a private capacity at their own expense . 
18 The British view, expressed in a note to the Japanese Government during the Asama Maru 
incident, cited in Briggs (op. cit., pp. 2.5o-r) is that: ". . under modern conditions, where 
conscription laws impose a liability to military or naval service on all able-bodied males, it 
is obvious that a right to remove 'military persons' would be illusory if it did not cover indi-
viduals who, though not on the peace-time_ strength of their country's armed forces, are under 
a legal liability to serve and are actually on their way to take their place in the ranks. Such 
persons are precisely those who are likely to be found travelling on neutral ships in time of 
war ... " The French Instructions of 1934, in Article 64, provided for the removal of enemy 
persons from neutral vessels-even where no cause existed for capturing the vessel-if making 
up a part of the armed forces, if en route to join these forces and, finally, if capable of military 
service (aptes au se1·vice militaire). On the other hand, the German Prize Law Code of 1939 
provided, in Article 77, that enemy persons undertaking a voyage on neutral vessels in order 
to join the enemy armed forces could be made prisoners of war only after the vessel had been 
captued (presumably on any one of a number of grounds). It may also be noted that Article 
38 (s) of the German Code declared that: "Aid to the enemy occurs if a vessel undertakes the 
voyage for the purpose of transmitting messages in the interests of the enemy or conveying 
members of the enemy forces or persons desirous of joining the enemy forces . . . '' In effect, 
then, the Code did not appear to stipulate a right of removal independent of capture. 
19 In a current review of the problem the observation has been made that it "appears unlikely 
that the old rules concerning the removal of persons from neutral shipping can much longer 
survive, even extended to include reservists and that it would appear foolhardy for a nation 
to permit any person of value to an enemy's war effort-particularly scientists-to return to 
his own country." Cmdr. Joe Munster, U.S. Navy, "Removal of Persons from Neutral Ship-
ping," The Judge Advocate General Journal, (October, 1952.), p. r8. 
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Certainly these latter suggestions cannot be taken-and are not put for-
\Vard-as indicative of present law, however prophetic they may be in 
pointing the way to future practice. But where the precise limits to the . 
belligerent right of removal may now be placed is a matter upon which no 
final word can be given. 20 
2.. Carriage of Dispatches 
According to the customary practice of states the carriage of dispatches 
for a belligerent is treated on the san1e basis as the carriage of enemy 
persons. Neutral merchant vessels found carrying dispatches of a public 
nature for and in the service of a belligerent, and particularly dispatches 
concerning military operations, are liable to seizure and condemnation. 21 
But one clear exception to this 1 ule covers the official correspondence 
maintained between an enemy and a neutral state. Since a neutral state has 
the undoubted right to carry on official intercourse with the belligerents, 
such correspondence as it may send to, or receive from, belligerents is 
inviolable, and neutral merchant vessels conveying these dispatches must 
not, for that reason, be seized. 22 Furthermore, according to Hague Con-
vention XI (1907) enemy dispatches in the forn1 of ordinary postal cor-
respondence are normally considered as inviolable, and a neutral merchant 
vessel carrying such dispatches among her postal correspondence is not, 
for that reason, liable to seizure. 23 
In view of the developments in the means of communication the carriage 
of dispatches now forms a subject of distinctly limited importance, but to 
the extent that it is still applicable to hostilities at sea the customary rules 
remain valid, though subject to the modifications already observed in 
examining the rules governing the carriage of enemy persons. 24 On the 
2° For one indication of the interpretation presently given to the belligerent right of removal' 
see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 513. 
21 Such carriage may occur between two parts of an enemy's territory, between two enemy 
states, or between an enemy agent abroad in a neutral state and his government. 
22 Thus the correspondence between a neutral government and that government's representa-
tive in an enemy state must not be disturbed, even though it may contain information harmful 
to the interests of the other belligerent. The same immunity seems to extend to the carriage 
of dispatches between an enemy government and its diplomatic representatives in neutral states. 
23 But Article 2. of Hague Convention XI states that neutral mail ships are not exempt from 
the rules governing neutral merchant ships in general, and although they cannot be seized for 
carrying enemy dispatches among their regular postal correspondence, neutral mail ships may 
be seized for unneutral service. For a more general discussion on mail in time of war, s~e pp. 9o-5. 
24 These changes will principally concern the belligerent right to remove disptaches from a 
neutral vessel without seizing the vessel as prize. The customary rule forbidding removal 
without seizure was equally applicable to enemy persons and dispatches. But the Declaration 
of London, while providing in Article 47 for the removal of enemy military personnel, e.ven 
though no cause might exist for seizure of the neutral vessel, failed to refer to the removal of 
dispatches. Might, therefore, a belligerent remove from a neutral vessel dispatches intended 
for the enemy without seizing the vessel? Hyde (op. cit., pp. 2.173-4) and Oppenheim-Lauter-
pacht (op. ct., p. 844), among others, answer this question affirmatively, and this position 
would appear to be sound. 
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whole, however, the "transmission of information in the interest of an 
enemy" 25 has now taken on new forms that bear only a faint resemblance 
to the more traditional act of carrying dispatches, and it may prove mis-
leading to endeavor to fit these new forms into a legal framework designed 
to regulate quite different acts. The transmission by radio or wireless of 
information to an enemy concerning military operations at sea is hardly 
comparable-save perhaps in name-to the carriage of dispatches. The 
former acts will normally prove of much more serious moment to the 
immediate security of a belligerent's forces. And whereas such trans-
mission of information assuredly gives rise to the belligerent right to seize 
the offending neutral merchant vessel, earlier pages have indicated that the 
preventive measures a belligerent may now resort to are considerably more 
severe in character. 26 
25 The phrase is taken from Article 45 (1) of the Declaration of London, which provided, in 
this respect, for the seizure and condemnation of a vessel making a voyage "with a view to the 
transmission of information in the interest of the enemy." 
26 See pp. 31_9-2-I. 
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